Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2015

Understanding State Constitutions: Locke and Key
Gary S. Lawson
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gary S. Lawson, Understanding State Constitutions: Locke and Key , in 93 Texas Law Review See Also 203
(2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/2548

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

Texas Law Review
See Also
Volume 93

Response
Understanding State Constitutions: Locke and Key
Gary Lawson*
Steve Calabresi and Sofia Vickery have done a great service by
uncovering the pre-Fourteenth Amendment case law in state courts interpreting and applying state constitutional provisions which contain "Lockean"
language guaranteeing rights to life, liberty, property, safety, happiness, or
some combination of those rights.' These cases are manifestly one of the
keys to understanding the legal world in which the Fourteenth Amendment
was crafted and ratified. It is instructive and fascinating to see the
development and application of these Lockean provisions, whose influence
seems to have spread beyond this country. 2 It is a pleasure and honor to be
asked to comment on this article.3
This study fits in elegantly with Professor Calabresi's ongoing project of
describing the state law background of the pre-Fourteenth Amendment era, 4
* Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law.
1. Steven G. Calabresi & Sofia M. Vickery, On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Original Understandingof the Lockean NaturalRights Guarantees, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 1299 (2015).
For examples of such clauses, see infra note 15. I use the term "Lockean" here very loosely and
metaphorically, as both I and others have done elsewhere. E.g., Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider
Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 727, 763 n.149 (1988). Professor Calabresi and Ms. Vickery
may have in mind something more precise and historically concrete. See Calabresi & Vickery,
supra, at 1314 15 (suggesting Locke's influence on George Mason, whose drafting was the basis
and model for the earliest Lockean provisions in state constitutions). Their usage may be entirely
accurate; I am simply not well enough versed in eighteenth-century intellectual history to make
strong claims about the influence of Locke on the founding generation.
2. Id. at 1320 22.
3. Honesty compels the disclosure that I am rather far from an impartial reviewer. Professor
Calabresi has been a colleague, a housemate, and (aside from my wife) my best friend for more than
thirty years. Nonetheless, I believe that everything in this comment is intellectually "clean," and I
do not think that I have pulled any punches.
4. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, IndividualRights Under State
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and it provides information that will prove invaluable to anyone trying to
come up with a theory of the Fourteenth Amendment or the federal case law
construing it. That some state courts, but not others, engaged in broad,
purposive reasoning about preambular or Declaration-like constitutional
provisions is a datum of which all scholars in this area need to take note.
Present company is not included in that last remark because I am not in
fact a scholar in this area. I have long shied away from theorizing about the
Fourteenth Amendment,5 and I do not plan to enter that thicket today.
Instead, I want to offer some cautionary remarks about potential uses (or
misuses) of this excellent project-remarks that I suspect the authors will
consider at worst a friendly amendment, which is certainly how they are
intended. Those cautions are of two types. The first type concerns the
parameters of the study itself, and the second concerns the implications of
that study for interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The authors themselves note some of the limitations of their study: It
does not cover cases construing Ninth Amendment-like provisions,6 which
arguably raise issues of legal interpretation similar to those addressed by the
study, and some of the cases discussed by the authors weave together
discussions of broad Lockean constitutional provisions with invocation of
more specific constitutional language. 7 The latter limitation is particularly
noteworthy; the entire class of cases involving litigation procedures, 8 for
example, could easily be characterized as cases about due process of law.
But some other limitations should be noted as well.
First, the dataset itself is actually quite small. More than 100 cases 9
sounds like a substantial number, but those cases are spread over decades;
many of them, as noted above, are ambiguous or equivocal about the actual
role played by the Lockean constitutional provisions in the decisions; and the
numerous cases failing to apply the Lockean provisions, in particular, are
often very terse or silent about the reasons for rejecting those claims, so it is
difficult to say much about what those courts thought. It would therefore be
difficult at best to generalize from this dataset. Certainly, it seems harder to
draw conclusions in this context than from a study of explicit state
constitutional provisions circa 1868.10

Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEXAS L. REV. 7 (2008) [hereinafter Calabresi &
Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions]; Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. Agudo &
Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills ofRights in 1787 and 1791: What IndividualRights Are Really Deeply
Rooted in American History and Tradition?,85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (2012).
5. E.g., Gary Lawson, The Bill ofRights as an Exclamation Point,33 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 512

n.7 (1999).
6. Calabresi & Vickery, supra note 1, at 1310 11.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1389 93.
9. Id. at 1441.
10. See Calabresi & Agudo, IndividualRights Under State Constitutions,supra note 4, at 12.
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Second, the very small number of cases that strongly applied Lockean
provisions seems to be concentrated in specific courts-primarily, at various
times, in California," Indiana, 12 and Maine.' 3 It may be that those decisions
are less a product of general background understandings that were widely
shared in the national legal community than of specific judges who happened
to be in the right place at the right time. I do not claim to know which, if
either, of these hypotheses is the most supportable. A useful sequel to this
study might be an examination of the general jurisprudential outlook of those
courts that seemed most inclined to take a broad view of Lockean
constitutional provisions. If those courts were somehow jurisprudentially
distinct from "mainstream" thinking, that might be important information to
know when assessing the potential consequences of their decisions. At the
very least, the concentration of certain kinds of decisions in a limited number
of courts suggests that one ought to be hesitant before drawing general
conclusions about pre-Fourteenth Amendment legal thought.
Even with these limitations, the implications of this article are far from
trivial. It is significant that some courts-even a relatively small numberwere willing to give strong application, or even serious consideration, to
broadly worded constitutional language that many modem observers might
be inclined to dismiss as hortatory, aspirational, or nonjusticiable. At a
minimum, that means that one cannot dismiss this kind of broad, rightsoriented reasoning about the Fourteenth Amendment out of hand without
more careful analysis.
That leads to my second set of cautions, which pertains to the
interpretative enterprise. This article is written against the backdrop, and
with an eye toward, actual and prospective interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. At numerous places, the authors point out past and present
applications of the Fourteenth Amendment that are potentially analogous to
the kinds of issues faced by pre-1868 state courts construing Lockean
provisions. 14 But relating this dataset to the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment is a very tricky endeavor.
The most obvious difficulty is that the Fourteenth Amendment contains
no Lockean provision. It contains a Due Process Clause, an Equal Protection
Clause, and a Privileges or Immunities Clause, but no clause whose wording
even approximates the kind of language about the purposes and ends of
government that characterizes the Lockean provisions about which Professor
Calabresi and Ms. Vickery write. 15 Even if one thinks that the purposive
11. See, e.g., Calabresi & Vickery, supra note 1, at 1375 76, 1377 79, 1409 12.
12. See, e.g., id at 1337 39, 1384 86.
13. See, e.g., id. at 1358 63.
14. See, e.g., id at 1304 06, 1393 94, 1407.
15. Compare, e.g., IASS. CONST. art. I (amended 1976) ("All men are born free and equal, and
have certain, natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness."), and VA. BWL OF
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reasoning that infuses some of the state court decisions construing Lockean
provisions is in some respect generalizable to interpretation of at least some
clauses of the federal Constitution, it is not at all obvious that it is
generalizable to interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in particular.
Indeed, the absence of Lockean language in the Fourteenth Amendment may
counsel against use of the kinds of interpretative methods identified by
Professor Calabresi and Ms. Vickery. If the drafters, ratifiers, or readers of
the Fourteenth Amendment really wanted or expected a Lockean
constitutional provision, they knew what one looked like-and the
Fourteenth Amendment isn't it.
Second, there is a fundamental difference between state constitutional
interpretation and interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. As far as the
federal Constitution is concerned, state governments are generally unlimited
except to the extent that the Constitution specifically constrains them.16 This
means, among other things, that the burden of proof on issues of
constitutional meaning most naturally falls on those who are challenging the
permissibility of state action by invoking the Fourteenth Amendment because
they are asserting an affirmative limitation. 17 But when state courts are
construing their own state constitutions, they might approach that enterprise
from a very different perspective. It would certainly be possible (though not
mandatory) for a state court to see its state constitution as a document that
creates and empowers state institutions, much as the federal Constitution
creates and empowers federal institutions. A constitutional provision that
sets out the purposes and ends of a government that is being created by that
constitution might therefore call for a different interpretative methodology
than does a provision limiting otherwise unlimited state governments. It
might suggest, for example, that the burden of proof for claims of
constitutional meaning should rest with the person arguing in favor of rather
than against state action, as I think the burden does rest with anyone arguing
in favor of federal action. For all of these reasons, any move from state
RIGHTS of 1864, § 1 ("That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact,
deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."), with U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. The one exception is state power over federal elections and constitutional amendments,
which stems from specific enumerated grants of power in the federal Constitution. See Gary
Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal
Protection,94 B.U. L. REV. 415, 429 n.76 (2014).
17. Or so I think. Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1235 (2012).
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constitutional interpretation to federal constitutional interpretation requires
several discrete steps beyond what is set forth in this article.
Third, the federal constitutional provision most analogous to the Lockean
provisions in state constitutions is the Preamble. Just as the Lockean
provisions set forth the purposes and ends of government, and thus of the
constitutions of which they are a part, the federal Preamble sets forth the
purposes and ends for which the federal Constitution is ordained and
established. 8 The most powerful application of Professor Calabresi and Ms.
Vickery's research may thus be to provide some measure of support for those
who urge a broadly purposive interpretation of the federal Constitution in
light of the ends described in the Preamble. The leading representatives of
this school of thought, and hence the most likely beneficiaries of any such
argument, would be Sotirios Barber 19 and James Fleming.
For those who are unfamiliar with this form of reasoning, it begins by
noting that the Preamble "lists substantive goods-good things, like 'the
''2z
common defense,' 'the general Welfare,' and 'the Blessings of Liberty."
The Constitution was created in order to achieve these ends. The ends, and
the governmental powers that are conferred in order to achieve them (not
limitations on governmental power), must therefore be the central themes of
constitutionalism: "[N]o rational actor would establish a government solely
or even chiefly for the sake of restraining it."22 The Constitution should, so
goes the argument, be interpreted so that it can achieve the ends for which it
was ordained and established.
While this kind of argument deserves more currency than it often gets, I
have never found it persuasive as an interpretative tool.2 3 The Constitution,

of course, does not merely prescribe ends and goals in the Preamble. It goes
on to specify, often in quite gruesome detail, the precise means by which it
expects those ends and goals to be pursued. Technically, the Constitution
does not authorize institutions of the national government to pursue specified
ends at all. Rather, it authorizes institutions of the national government to

18. See U.S. CONST. pmbl., which states:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
19. See generally SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
20. See generally SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS (2007) [hereinafter BARBER & FLEMING,
CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION];

JAMES

E.

FLEMING,

FIDELITY

TO

OUR

CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS (forthcoming
21. SOTnRRoS A. BARBER, THE FALLACIES OF STATES' RIGHTS 3 (2013).

IMPERFECT

2015).

22. Id. at 177.
23. That may not be either surprising or unwelcome to advocates of this form of constitutional
argument, both because I suspect that it is meant to be normative political theory more than positive
interpretative theory and because Iam unlikely to be the argument's target audience.
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pursue certain tasks through certain forms. There is, for example, no
"promote national security" clause in the Constitution; there is simply a set
of clauses that authorizes various actors to engage in tasks that, so the
document contemplates, will promote national security if done well. Nor is
there a "general welfare" clause, in the sense of a clause authorizing some
institution of the national government to pursue the general welfare. (Those
who think that they have found one in Article I, Section Eight, Clause One
have not read that clause carefully enough: The "general welfare" language
in that clause identifies proper purposes of taxation but does not grant
Congress any power. 24 ) One might well draft a constitution hoping or
expecting it to achieve certain ends, but that does not mean that the
Constitution is itself a direct authorization to pursue those ends rather than a
specification of means that might or might not, as things play out,
accomplish those ends with any particular degree of efficacy. From an
interpretative standpoint, it is far from obvious that the ends and goals should
be privileged over the specified means-and perhaps closer to obvious that
the reverse is true.
In response to my doubts, an advocate of purposive, or teleological,
reasoning about the federal Constitution could point to the practices of state
courts construing provisions analogous to the Preamble as evidence that such
reasoning was an accepted, if not standard, tool of interpretation of such
provisions. Can one draw any insight into this dispute about the character of
constitutional interpretation from Professor Calabresi and Ms. Vickery's
article?
I would have been interested to hear the authors' view on that question
(they do not address it), but I personally doubt whether much can be gleaned
one way or the other. The purposive interpretative approach applied by some
state courts has some similarity to the "moral reading" of the Constitution
advocated by Professors Barber and Fleming25 and therefore might be
thought to support such a reading of the 1788 Constitution. But the failure of
many other courts to apply such reasoning to their Lockean constitutional
provisions could just as easily be thought to tug in the other direction. More
concretely, the case law identified by Professor Calabresi and Ms. Vickery
lends its strongest analogical support to the idea of unenumerated rights
against the federal government, but that particular idea is already quite firmly

24. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 24 25 (2004); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also

Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or the President's Paramour):An Examination of the
Views of Hamilton, Afadison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States
Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 142-44 (1999).
25. BARBER & FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 20, at xiii; see also
James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Mlloral Readings of the
American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2012) ("By a 'moral reading,' I refer to a
conception of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles, not codifying
concrete historical rules or practices.").
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embedded in the federal Constitution through the general principle of
enumerated powers, the Necessary and Proper Clause,26 the Ninth
Amendment,27 and the fiduciary character of the Constitution.28 It does not
need a lot of extra support from state law analogies. Extending that idea to
unenumerated federal rights against state governments under the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, is another matter altogether. Perhaps it can be
done-I have no general theory of the Fourteenth Amendment that I am
prepared to defend with academic rigor and therefore have no official
opinion on that question-but for reasons given above, the Fourteenth
Amendment is among the least promising federal constitutional candidates
for a Lockean-style reading. It does not contain the kind of language typical
of Lockean provisions; its interpretation is properly subject to a burden of
proof rule that amounts to a presumption against the invalidity of state
action; and its connection to the Preamble is more remote, both temporally
and conceptually, than is the connection of the text of the 1788 Constitution.
In sum, I see relatively little interpretative traction, in any particular
direction, for understanding the Fourteenth Amendment to be drawn from
Professor Calabresi and Ms. Vickery's article.
But all of the foregoing is somewhat beside the point-or at least
somewhat beside the point that I think Professor Calabresi and Ms. Vickery
are trying to make. I do not see them as really arguing that the case law that
they present has strong textual and structural implications for interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment (or of the federal Constitution more broadly).
Rather, the trigger for much of their analysis is the idea of rights that are
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 29 Professor Calabresi
and Ms. Vickery correctly note that this phrase has become something of a
rallying cry for those Justices who are willing to read some relatively narrow
and cabined set of rights into the Fourteenth Amendment (and the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause) without engaging in seemingly openended philosophizing or judicial creativity. 0 This idea of "deeply rooted"
rights is, I believe, a jurisprudential creation of the interaction between
precedent, the perceived need for social acceptance of court decisions, and a
strong conception of a limited judicial role. It is not the product of anything
that I can recognize as a form of interpretation of the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As I have said, I do not have a theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment that I am prepared to set forth and defend. There are a great
many such theories that are, at a minimum, intellectually defensible.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
"Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A JurisdictionalInterpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43
DuKE L.J. 267 (1993).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; see Lawson & Granger, supra note 26, at 326 30.
28. See generally Lawson, et. al., supra note 16.
29. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).

30. Calabresi & Vickery, supra note 1, at 1302.
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Nonetheless, a theory that would read the text of the Fourteenth Amendment
to protect those rights, but only those rights, deeply rooted in history and
tradition does not strike me as one of those intellectually defensible theories.
It might very well be a normatively attractive political conception, and one
that will secure a good deal of popular support, but I have a hard time seeing
how one could reasonably claim that it is the best reading of the words of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
If one is not really interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment but is instead
trying to understand, apply, and refine certain ideas generated by a body of
case law that is mostly untethered to the actual Constitution, then the textual
and structural cautions that I have raised above are not really relevant. If one
is looking for what is deeply rooted in history and tradition, one needs to
look carefully at history and tradition, not at the text and structure of the
Constitution. For that purpose, the study conducted by Professor Calabresi
and Ms. Vickery is obviously quite pertinent. The cautions concerning the
limitations of the study itself-both those declared by the authors and (so I
think) the others that I have outlined here-remain important, but arguments
about how to connect the study's findings to the constitutional text may be
about as significant as arguments about the consistency of the administrative
state with the Constitution. In other words: Of almost no significance
whatsoever.

